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Abstract
A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alter-
native to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale
electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of elec-
tricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of
true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the
two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A spe-
cific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the
quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the
start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the gener-
ation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly
higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms
of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial differ-
ence between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs
result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the com-
petitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the
OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the
designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM
and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms
and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D4, D61, L94
Keywords: strategic behavior, sealed-bid auction, complex offer auction, elec-
tricity, efficiency
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1. Introduction 
Many wholesale electric power markets employ auctions that differ in their offer 
complexity from other common quantity-price offer auctions. Besides the quantities and 
the minimum offer prices, the sellers may also declare their technical constraints and 
start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the plants. The 
generation contracts are generally allocated by a sealed-offer auction that employs a 
computationally involved market-clearing algorithm. Besides applying a rule for offer 
selection, a market-clearing algorithm has to ensure that the system demand and reserve 
requirements are met over a particular time period. In this paper, I compare the 
performance of two such algorithms by using laboratory experiments. An offer cost 
minimization (OCM) algorithm is currently used by independent system operators (ISOs) 
in the United States. It relies on the traditional unit commitment approach.2 A payment 
cost minimization (PCM) algorithm, designed to lower the procurement cost of 
electricity, is proposed as an alternative to the existing mechanism.3 With the exception 
of a few game theoretic studies (Knoblauch 2005, Shunda 2005, Baltaduonis 2006), 
comparisons of these auction mechanisms rely on the assumption of true production cost 
revelation (Alonso et al. 1999, Arroyo & Conejo 2002, Yan & Stern 2002, Luh et al. 
2005a, 2005b). In this paper, I test the claim that the PCM auction could lead to 
significant savings to consumers and that those savings might be at the expense of 
efficiency. Allowing for strategic behavior, the experimental study, similarly to Rassenti, 
Smith & Wilson (2003a, 2003b), hereafter, RSW, strictly controls for the level of 
unilateral market power and simulates trading environments with minimal demand 
                                                 
2 For a bibliographical survey on the unit commitment problem see Padhy (2004). 
3 For the mathematical formulation of the proposed algorithm see Luh et al. (2005a). 
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elasticity, cyclical demand uncertainties and an absence of significant excess generation 
capacity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Market Institution, Structure, and Environment 
defines market power in a sealed complex-offer market. It outlines the market structure 
and design for the experiment. This section provides an example that highlights the major 
differences of the OCM and the PCM auctions. Experimental Design and Procedures 
discusses the procedures of the experiment, and Results presents the findings. 
Conclusions summarizes the analysis and suggests the direction of future research. 
 
2. Market Institution, Structure, and Environment 
To isolate the institutional effects of the strategically complex auctions, I examine a 
very simple environment, relative to actual electric power systems: (i) transmission 
constraints are negligible; (ii) generators have no physical ramping rates; (iii) security 
reserves and other ancillary services to protect the system from outages are ignored; and 
(iv) a trading institution accepts flat offer curves for each generating unit. Such an 
environment is most comparable to the day-ahead wholesale markets of observed power 
systems. Hour-ahead and real time power markets are organized in a similar fashion, but 
they also more often employ locational marginal pricing instead of having one uniform 
price for the whole energy pool region. The performance of the PCM auction is measured 
against the OCM auction in a stationary supply and cyclic demand environment with 
varying levels of unilateral market power. 
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2.1. Auction Institution 
The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of two complex-offer 
auction rules (OCM and PCM) while holding constant all other characteristics of the 
system – the costs and structure of supply, the resale values and structure of demand. The 
criteria for evaluation are allocation efficiency, procurement cost of the commodity to the 
buyers, production efficiency, and volatility of prices. Since demand-side bidding is often 
absent in the naturally occurring spot markets for electricity, similarly to RSW, a 
computer is used to submit bids that perfectly reveal the demand at any point in time in 
all experiments. The sellers privately submit a schedule of offers, i.e. plant start-up fees 
and prices, for their production capacity for each pricing period. The offers and the 
computerized bids are then sent to an optimization algorithm to allocate the production 
contracts for the next day. Each day includes four pricing periods: night (low demand/off 
peak period), morning (medium demand/shoulder period), afternoon (high demand/peak 
period) and evening (medium demand/shoulder period). Four pricing periods during the 
day are a simplification of the naturally occurring day-ahead electricity markets, where 
separate prices are instituted hourly. Nevertheless, the cyclical dynamics of the demand 
are preserved.  
Currently, the dominant practice in electricity spot markets is to employ uniform 
price auctions where each seller receives the same market price for megawatts sold. The 
market price is usually the highest accepted price per megawatt among all of the sellers. I 
retain these institutional features and leave aside the discussion of “pay-as-offered” 
discriminatory price auctions.4 In both the OCM and the PCM experimental treatments, 
                                                 
4 For experimental investigations of uniform price versus discriminatory price auctions with simple offers 
see Mount, Schulze, Thomas & Zimmerman (2001), and Rassenti, Smith & Wilson (2003b). 
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the sellers get paid the uniform prices and their individual start-up fees. The difference in 
the treatments lies in the optimization objective of a market-clearing algorithm.  
In the case of a uniform-price auction, where sellers also request fixed start-up fees, 
the mechanism of distributing these fees across the consumers is important. One way to 
do that is to divide the borne fees equally over the units dispatched during the period for 
which the extra generation capacity was required. The markup on offered price creates a 
gap between a uniform price that all sellers receive and a uniform price that all buyers 
pay. In this experiment, both the OCM and the PCM algorithms employ this method to 
compute the buyer prices and to determine the corresponding levels of demand. 
The following numerical example demonstrates the principles of the offer-selection 
rules for both auctions. 
 
Example 1: A Simple Wholesale Electricity Market 
To highlight the major differences in the above-mentioned market-clearing rules I 
use a three-supplier market described by Knoblauch (2005). Consider an electricity 
market for one hour. The demand is inelastic and equal to 2 units. Supplier 1 (S1) and 
Supplier 2 (S2) are identical. They incur 6 dollars of fixed costs to start up their plants 
and 93 dollars of variable costs to generate one unit of electricity. Each of them can 
supply 0, 1 or 2 units of energy. Supplier 3 (S3) has start-up cost of 20 dollars and energy 
cost of 70 dollars per unit. She can supply 0 or 1 unit of energy.  
For the purpose of this example suppose that all suppliers submit offers that reflect 
their true production costs. Given these offers the two auctions would generate the 
following outcomes. 
 5
 The OCM Auction 
The OCM algorithm minimizes the total offered cost of electricity, as if all selected 
sellers would be paid their offered prices and fees. Given the offers, an ISO calculates the 
minimum offered cost from two cases: (1) buying 2 units from either S1 or S2, OR (2) 
buying 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2): 
 
Min{Price1,2×2+Fee1,2 , Price3+Fee3+Price1,2+Fee1,2}, 
Min{93×2+6, 70+20+93+6}=70+20+93+6=189. 
 
The auction chooses to buy 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2). After the offers 
are selected, a uniform market-clearing price is determined as the highest accepted price 
for that period; the market price is 93 (=max{70, 93}). All selected sellers receive their 
individual start-up fees and the uniform market price for the supplied electricity during 
that period; the total procurement cost of electricity is 212 (=93×2+20+6). The uniform 
market price that all buyers pay is 106 [=93+(20+6)÷2)]. Notice that this contract 
allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to generate 2 units of electricity 
cheaper than the chosen suppliers do. 
 
The PCM Auction 
The PCM algorithm minimizes the actual procurement cost of electricity, 
simultaneously determining a market-clearing price as the highest accepted price during 
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that period. An ISO calculates the minimum procurement cost in two cases: 1) buying 2 
units from either S1 or S2, OR 2) buying 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2): 
 
Min{Price1,2×2+Fee1,2 , max{Price3 , Price1,2}×2+Fee3+Fee1,2}, 
Min{93×2+6, max{70, 93}×2+20+6}=93×2+6=192. 
 
The auction chooses to buy 2 units from S1(S2). The market-clearing price is 93. As 
in the OCM auction, the selected sellers receive their individual start-up fees and the 
uniform market-clearing price for the supplied electricity. Both the total procurement cost 
and the total generation cost are equal to 192 (=93×2+6). The market price for buyers is 
96 (=93+6÷2). This contract allocation is not production efficient, since S3’s plant with 
relatively lower average total cost is idle. 
 
In the preceding example, given the assumption of truthful production cost 
revelation, the PCM auction produces the lowest procurement cost of electricity. On the 
other hand, the PCM auction yields a production inefficient allocation. Intuitively then, 
one could think that in a competitive environment, the PCM auction should result in 
contract allocations that are cheaper to the buyers and the OCM auction should result in 
allocations that cost less to produce. After all, that is exactly what these optimization 
algorithms were designed to minimize. The example also suggests that there might be a 
trade off between lower electricity cost to the buyers and production efficiency. 
Both the OCM and the PCM auctions are designed to sell the maximum amount of 
electricity where buyers’ marginal willingness to pay is no less than the average 
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procurement cost. Tied offer combinations in the OCM auction are chosen in a way that 
generates lower procurement cost. Tied offer combinations in the PCM auction are 
selected by giving priority to those sellers whose offered cost is lower. Such a tie-
breaking mechanism gives the best performance chances to both complex-offer auctions, 
though to achieve similar tie-breaking in real life applications would require additional 
costly computational power and time. 
 
2.2. Unilateral Market Power 
Concerns for market power abound in the electric power industry. A comparison of 
the OCM and the PCM auctions would not be adequate without an investigation of the 
relationship between the degree of market competitiveness and an auction’s performance. 
In the experiment, I develop a market environment that strictly controls for structural 
features of market power. Given the inelastic nature of the market demand for electricity, 
one might want to know which trading rules are more effective in suppressing the 
exercise of market power. 
In the context of capacity-constrained competitors, Holt (1989) defines market 
power as the ability to deviate profitably and unilaterally from the competitive outcome. 
Davis and Holt (1994), and RSW (2003) create market-power incentives in the simple-
offer laboratory markets by reallocating production capacities in the market while 
keeping the market supply unchanged. My study uses a similar approach. Recall the 
three-supplier market described in example 1. Transferring two of S2’s capacity units to 
S1 would undoubtedly create unilateral market power in an effective duopoly. S1 would 
be guaranteed to supply at least one unit to the market. She could unilaterally bid up the 
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price for her unit and earn a significant profit as long as the market demand is perfectly 
inelastic. If S1 submitted a low offer with the hope to supply two units to the market, she 
would risk losing her guaranteed profit. In this case, offering the capacity at high prices 
and/or start-up fees is a dominant strategy for S1.  
 
2.2.1. No Power Treatment 
 
Figure 1. Market Structure and Design 
 
Tables 1 and 2, as well as Figure 1, depict aggregate supply and demand in the 
experimental environment. Following RSW, I implement the condition that the buyers 
perfectly reveal their willingness to pay. The second and third steps of the demand in 
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Table 1 represent interruptible units of demand, whereas the units on the first step at 250 
are the “must serve” units. The level of “must serve” demand varied among three levels: 
1 unit in off-peak periods, 4 units during shoulder periods, and 14 units during peak 
periods. Recent spikes in energy prices prompted various attempts to increase the 
responsiveness of retail demand to wholesale energy prices. The idea is to promote the 
management of electricity consumption, especially when the wholesale prices exceed 
some critical levels. 
Table 1. Demand Schedules 
Demand Quantity (demand values) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Off-peak 1 (250) 1 (80) N/A 
Shoulder 4 (250) 2 (230) 1 (160) 
Peak 14 (250) 2 (230) 2 (160) 
 
Table 2. Minimum Average Total Costs (ATC) of Generation by Generator Type 
Generator 
Type  
Min 
Load 
Max 
Load 
Start-up 
Cost 
Energy 
Cost 
ATC at 
Max Load 
Total Load 
(Quantity) Units Units $ $/Unit $/Unit Units 
A (2) 0 2 0 20 20 4 
B (1) 1 1 10 15 25 1 
C (1) 0 1 20 70 90 1 
D (2) 0 2 6 93 96 4 
E (2) 0 2 120 112 172 4 
F (1) 0 2 80 132 172 2 
G (2) 0 2 40 152 172 4 
H (1) 0 2 0 225 225 2 
I (1) 0 2 0 255 255 2 
Total 24 
 
In the designed market, there are thirteen plants of nine types. The technical 
characteristics of each plant are presented in Table 2. Some of them have low start-up 
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costs with high production costs per unit, while other plants have high start-up costs but 
lower production costs. In the No Power treatment, all plants are owned by six firms (or 
sellers) denoted by an “S” and an identification number. S1 and S2 own two low cost 
(Type A) generation plants and two high cost generation plants (Type H and G 
respectively). S3 and S4 own two high cost (Type E) plants and, respectively, one 
baseload (Type B) generation plant and one intermediate cost (Type C) plant where 
generation capacity is one unit. S4 also owns a very high cost (Type I) peak capacity 
plant with average total cost exceeding even the resale value at the “must serve” level. 
Each S5 and S6 own one intermediate cost (Type D) plant and one high cost (Type G and 
F respectively) peak capacity generation plant.  
These pairs are designed to be Bertrand-like competitors that share an identical 
structure of generation costs at the certain demand level. In off-peak periods, the baseload 
plants owned by S1, S2 and S3 depict the three-competitor market structure described by 
Knoblauch (2005) and later analyzed by Baltaduonis (2006). During shoulder periods, the 
intermediate cost plants owned by S4, S5 and S6 resemble a similar market but with 
different cost distribution. When start-up cost bidding is limited, Knoblauch shows that a 
Bertrand competition game in these markets results in a competitive outcome. The 
market during peak periods is designed to be competitive as well. Five sellers with ten 
units of similar cost capacity are competing to supply at least six units of peak demand. 
In the presence of complex-offers, where a seller receives not only a price for each 
sold unit but also a fixed fee, the notion of a competitive outcome can not be summarized 
by a market-clearing price that all sellers receive. A seller asking a price equal to 
marginal cost can still exercise her market power by charging a higher fee than the actual 
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start-up cost and possibly causing a deadweight loss if this action reduces the number of 
units traded. In the No Power treatments of my experiments, I design the market structure 
such that, at a given period of the demand cycle, the non-cooperating marginal generators 
would have incentives to submit offers that request payments that do not exceed the 
actual production costs of the marginal units. However, the requested fees do not 
necessarily need to be the actual start-up costs if the asked seller prices are adjusted 
accordingly. Consider the OCM auction for an illustration. 
Take the shoulder demand period following the off-peak. Each S5 and S6 owns a 
marginal intermediate cost plant that competes to supply the marginal seventh unit to the 
market. Either plant can generate this marginal unit at a cost of 99 [6+93]. If a seller 
offers to supply the unit at a cost higher than 99, in the OCM auction, the other seller 
would be able to undercut the offer by either lowering the fixed fee or offered price. 
Therefore, a competitive price that all sellers receive should not exceed 99 during the 
shoulder periods. On the other hand, the price that all buyers pay in this case can be as 
high as 155. This would happen if other low cost generators (Type A, B and C) decided to 
recover their costs exclusively through fixed fees, i.e. submitting offers with prices equal 
to zero and start-up fees equal to 98 (<99) for one-unit capacity generators and equal to 
196 (=2×98) for two-unit capacity generators. The OCM auction would select these 
offers before the marginal offers of 99. As discussed above, the amount of fees would be 
used to mark-up the buyer price during the shoulder period [99 + (98 × 4 ÷ 7) = 155]. In 
this case, the buyer price of 155 would correspond to a competitive outcome in the OCM 
auction. 
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If we apply a similar analysis to other periods of the demand cycle, we find that the 
price (both for sellers and buyers) should not exceed 20 during the off-peak periods. The 
maximum price during the peak periods should be 172 and 230 for sellers and buyers 
respectively. And the price (both for sellers and buyers) should not exceed 93 during the 
shoulder periods following the peak demand. Notice that the shoulder periods before and 
after the peak demand have the same demand and supply structures. However, most of 
the plants are not idle after the peak period. Therefore, they do not incur start-up costs 
and do not receive start-up fees to continue generation during the second shoulder period 
of a day. For this reason, the competition during this period can be modeled as a standard 
Bertrand-competition game, where the competitive price equals the marginal cost. The 
comparison of the two shoulder periods should provide some insights on competition 
with complex offers versus simple offers. 
The PCM auction results in the same upper bounds for the competitive buyer and 
seller prices as in the OCM auction. The result follows from the identical structure of an 
offer in both auctions and from the presence of marginal “twin” competitors at every 
level of the market demand. There are many pure strategy Nash equilibria that correspond 
to a competitive outcome in these auctions. However, one could expect that in a 
competitive environment, the PCM auction should result in contract allocations that are at 
least as cheap to the buyers as in the OCM auction. After all, the PCM algorithm was 
designed for this objective.  
Similarly, one could expect that in a competitive environment, the OCM auction 
should result in contract allocations that are at least as cheap to produce as in the PCM 
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auction. There are pure strategy Nash equilibria that achieve 100% production efficiency 
in both auctions.  
The experiment could shed some light as to whether some equilibria are more likely 
to dominate in the OCM and the PCM auctions. The No Power treatment is my attempt to 
design a market structure that would contain minimal market power in a complex-offer 
auction. 
 
2.2.2. Power Treatment 
Market power can be raised merely by transferring the ownership of S2’s and S6’s 
plants to S1 and S5, respectively. The reallocation of plant ownership gives the power to 
S1 and S5 to charge more for the marginal units. In the Power treatments, S1 and S5 can 
unilaterally increase their profits by raising the offers for the off-peak and shoulder 
periods regardless of the auction.  
For example, during an off-peak period, S1 is basically guaranteed to sell at least 
one unit as long as the buyer price does not exceed the second step of the demand curve 
(80). Instead of competing with S3’s and her own plants, S1 can profitably withdraw 
three units of generation capacity (or equivalently raise the offers for those units). 
Depending on S3’s offer, there are many stable pure strategy Nash equilibria with 
different profit shares. Notice that by withdrawing relatively cheaper capacity from the 
market, S1 also causes production inefficiency.  
Similarly, during a shoulder period, S5 can profitably increase the offer for her 
marginal unit. As long as the buyer price does not exceed the third shoulder demand step 
(160), S5 should be able to earn a positive profit. In equilibrium, the size of the profit 
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would depend on the offers of S1, S3 and S4.  However, during the second shoulder 
period of a day, when most plants are not eligible for fixed fees, S5 should set the price at 
exactly 160 and earn profit of 67. In shoulder periods, the production efficiency should be 
preserved even when market power is exercised.  
Notice that during the peak demand, all unilateral deviations from the competitive 
outcome are unprofitable in both No Power and Power treatments. This should serve as a 
common control across sessions in both treatments. 
The structural features of market power in my experiment suggest similar 
incentives in both the OCM and the PCM auctions. Holt (1989) points out that the notion 
of unilateral market power can be sensitive to the distinguishing characteristics of market 
institutions. He notes that the effects of institutions often seem to dominate the effects of 
structural characteristics of the market. The experiment could show whether such 
institutional effects exist. 
The purpose of this experiment is to compare the performance of the OCM and the 
PCM auctions, holding the production capabilities, demand levels and competitive 
predictions constant. In fact, if all sellers would truthfully submit their actual generation 
cost, in both the OCM and the PCM auction, the amount of exchanged units during each 
period of a day would be the same, the total procurement cost of electricity during the 
day would be the same, and the total generation cost of electricity would be barely one 
percent higher under the PCM auction. 
Providing rather equal grounds for both auctions to perform, I intend to use the 
experimental data to test the theoretical results developed by Knoblauch (2005) and 
Baltaduonis (2006). Their game theoretic models predict that at a given period of the 
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demand cycle of a No Power treatment, the marginal generators will submit the offers 
that are equal to the actual production costs of the marginal units. Consequently, in the 
constructed environment both auctions should perform the same with regards to the 
efficiency and the procurement cost in the off-peak periods. But in the shoulder 1 periods, 
the PCM auction should result in cheaper allocations to buyers, whereas the OCM 
auction should produce more efficient allocations. The same comparative statics hold for 
the Power treatments with the difference being that procurement cost of the commodity 
rises from a competitive level to a supra-competitive level. The suggested tradeoff 
between lower electricity cost and production efficiency is considered as well. 
The degree of susceptibility to the exercise of market power over the course of a 
day and the propensity to reveal the true generation costs in these auctions are other 
questions of interest in this paper. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1. Experimental Design 
Table 3 summarizes the balanced 2 × 2 experimental design with four replications 
in each cell. Each session lasted 53 trading days.5 The experimental dataset contains data 
from 848 trading days. 
 
 
                                                 
5 I originally planed to have 60 trading days per session. However, the first conducted session was 
interrupted by the computer network failure after the 53rd day. Since the data from that first session 
suggested that the bidding behavior in the market stabilized around the 35th day, I decided to shorten the 
rest of the sessions to 53 days as well. 
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Table 3. Experimental Design (No. of Sessions; No. of Trading Days per Session) 
 OCM PCM Total 
No Power (4; 53) (4; 53) (8; 53) 
Power (4; 53) (4; 53) (8; 53) 
Total (8; 53) (8; 53) (16; 53) 
 
3.2. Procedures 
To compare how the behavior and market performance differ in the OCM and the 
PCM auctions, I conducted 16 market experiments using undergraduate students at 
George Mason University. Four sessions for each cell in Table 3 were conducted using 
the experimental software that we developed at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic 
Science at George Mason University. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes.  
The subjects in each market were provided with complete information on the 
market supply structure; i.e. every plant’s minimum and maximum production capacity, 
start-up cost, cost per unit and the ownership of all plants were public information. 
Information on demand, however, was not available to the subjects. The situation was 
framed as a market for identical product to avoid the use of possibly intimidating or 
confusing electric power generation jargon. An experimenter informed the subjects that 
the costs and production capacities for each seller would not change during the 
experiment, but that the quantities of the product that the computer buyer will purchase 
would vary over the course of a day. In particular, the instructions indicated that the 
computer will purchase “low” amounts of product for the first quarter of a day, 
“medium” amounts for the second quarter of a day, “high” amounts for the third quarter 
of a day and “medium” amounts for the fourth quarter of a day. Each day consisted of a 
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four period cycle: off-peak, shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2 periods. The subjects did not 
know the total number of trading days in advance.  
6A subject had 75 seconds to submit an offer for each day.  An offer indicated the 
prices, start-up fees and quantities of the product that a seller was willing to supply from 
a particular plant over the course of the following day. The subjects could not alter the 
minimum and maximum quantities of the offer.7 These quantities were set equal to the 
minimum and maximum capacities of a plant. However, the subjects could still 
effectively withdraw the capacity from the market by asking extremely high prices for 
those capacity units. Thus, a seller had to decide on the price and the start-up fee for each 
plant and for each quarter of the upcoming day.8 The instructions pointed out that the 
actual market price may be higher than their offered price and that all sellers would 
receive the same market price if their offer was selected. The sellers received start-up 
fees only for the periods when their plant had to be started. In the beginning of each day 
all plants were idle. An experimenter also explained a rule of offer selection. A subject 
could at any time within the 75 seconds period revise her offer.  
At the end of the trading day, all offers were sent to the computerized market 
coordinator. A market-clearing algorithm was applied and the results of a sealed-offer 
auction were sent back to the sellers. Each seller could see how many units she sold, what 
the market price for each period was and what profit/loss she earned on every owned 
                                                 
6 An exception was made for the first day offers. The sellers could take as much time as they needed to 
formalize their initial offers. Once the last seller submitted his/her offer for the first day, the following 
trading days were limited to 75 seconds. The chosen time frame is similar to one-minute trading days of the 
RSW electric power experiments. 
7 ISOs usually demand an explanation if generators change their offered generation capacity or technical 
constraints. Thus strategic behavior is somewhat limited with regards to these parameters of an offer. 
8 I am aware that there are various initiatives to regulate start-up cost reimbursement (e.g. limiting the 
ability to change the start-up fees freely; partial start-up cost reimbursement) for electric power generators 
in real life. However, the purpose of the study is to investigate the performance of the two auctions when 
such regulations are absent. 
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capacity unit during each period of a day. The screens also displayed a history of the 
market prices from the past 10 days and the sold quantities during each quarter of the last 
day. The amount of paid fees was not public information.9
Subjects were paid $7 for showing up on time for the sessions. In addition to this 
show-up payment, the average earnings per subject for the data reported here was $21.47. 
 
4. Results 
The OCM and the PCM auctions on average extract respectively 92 and 94 percent 
of maximum social surplus in the No Power treatments. In Power treatments, both 
auctions capture 90 percent of the maximum possible surplus. Both auctions on average 
sell 32 and 31 units a day in No Power and Power treatments respectively. Thus, 
considering that the demand side of the market is perfectly revealed in the experiment, 
the drop in allocative efficiency in Power treatments can be at least partially attributed to 
output reduction. On the other hand, the difference in allocative efficiency between two 
auctions in No Power treatments must arise due to the different levels of production 
inefficiency. To have an idea how the captured social surplus is allocated among buyers 
and sellers, and how volatile the allocation is, Figure 2 depicts the buyer prices in each 
session of the four conducted treatments. The last seventeen days of the data are grouped 
by level of demand (quarter) and then sequenced by how the demand varied over a 
market day: off-peak, shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2. 
I evaluate the results with respect to true cost revelation. The outcome of true cost 
revelation is particularly interesting in the electricity markets because the design and the 
                                                 
9 See Appendix A for the experimental instructions and Appendix B for an example of a subject screen 
during an experiment. 
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engineering of these complicated market systems often start with the assumption of true 
cost revelation. In Figure 2, the outcome of perfectly revealed costs is shown as a solid 
line. The dotted line represents the value of the nearest unit of interruptible demand. The 
prices up to the dotted line are 100% efficient with respect to allocation. As an attempt to 
control for the convergence of the bidding behavior I focus on the last 17 market days 
(1/3 of all days) in each session.  
From Figure 2, it is evident that the outcome of perfectly revealed costs does not 
dominate in the markets with the exception of shoulder 2 periods. In shoulder 2 periods, 
when most of the plants are already operating and, therefore, not eligible for the start-up 
fees, the sellers compete purely on prices and apparently are more likely to approach the 
true cost revelation outcome. The absence of fixed costs in this period leads to relatively 
competitive outcomes in both No Power and Power treatments regardless of the auction. 
Shoulder 2 gets closer to the true cost revelation than any other quarter of a day. A 
relatively competitive performance of the auctions in shoulder 2 periods of the Power 
treatments, however, is unexpected. From the figure, the differences between No Power 
and Power treatments are not obvious, especially for the OCM auction. It is apparent, 
however, that the Power sessions of the PCM auction are likely to experience inefficient 
prices causing allocative inefficiencies, while the prices of the OCM auction fluctuate 
within the efficient price range. 
In what follows, the experimental results are summarized as a series of five 
findings. In addition to the qualitative results displayed in the figures, I analyze the data 
using a mixed-effects model for repeated measures on each of several sessions using 
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10different subjects.  The results from estimating this model for the buyer prices by level 
of demand are given in Table 4. The dependent variable in this case is the difference 
between the observed buyer price (Price) and the buyer price when generation costs are 
perfectly revealed by the sellers, Pt. The treatment effects (Power and PCM) are modeled 
as (zero-one) fixed effects, whereas the sessions are modeled as random effects, ei. As 
mentioned above, the experimental days are divided into three equal groups to capture the 
effects like learning over time. In the model, the data from the First and Second groups 
(days 1-18 and 19-36 respectively) are identified by (zero-one) dummy variables. 
Specifically, the estimated model is: 
 
Priceij-Pt=µ+ei+β1PCMi+ β2Poweri +β3PCMi×Poweri + β4Firsti + β5Secondi 
+β6PCMi×Firsti+ β7PCMi×Secondi + β8Poweri×Firsti+ β9Poweri×Secondi + 
β10PCMi×Poweri×Firsti+ β11PCMi×Poweri×Secondi +εij; 
 
11where the sessions are indexed by i=1,…,16 and the repeated market days by j=1,…,53.  
ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ N(0,σ
2
2,i). I begin with the findings related to the procurement cost 
first and then follow with the results regarding the efficiency of the auctions. 
 
Finding 1: Both the OCM and the PCM auctions do not elicit true cost telling in the 
periods when start-up costs are relevant, i.e. off-peak, shoulder 1 and peak periods. The 
departure from the true cost revealing outcome is greater in the PCM/Power than in the 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Longford 1993. 
11 Similar mixed-effects models were used in other experimental studies of electricity markets (Rassenti, 
Smith and Wilson, 2003a and 2003b; Kiesling and Wilson, 2007). 
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PCM/No Power treatment, whereas  the OCM/Power and the OCM/No Power treatments 
do not exhibit such a difference.  
 
Support: Figure 2 clearly shows that both auctions can produce buyer prices that are 
much higher than the prices corresponding to the revealed true costs. In all three periods 
where new plants need to be started, i.e. in off-peak, shoulder 1 and peak periods, the 
prices are higher even in the No Power treatments. On the other hand, shoulder 2 prices 
are much closer to the “truth” outcome. These qualitative observations are supported by 
estimates from the mixed-effects model in Table 4. In the shoulder 1 (peak, off-peak) 
periods, the OCM/No Power treatment significantly raises buyer prices above the prices 
of “truth” revelation [p-value=0.0108 (<.0001, 0.1092)]. The PCM/No Power treatment 
mirrors these results [p-value=0.0184 (<.0001, 0.0022)].12 There is no significant 
difference between the prices in the OCM/Power and the OCM/No Power treatments 
during all periods of a day (p-values=0.1112, 0.5482, 0.8272, 0.2828 for off-peak, 
shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2 periods respectively). The PCM/Power treatment, on the 
other hand, significantly raises prices above the PCM/No Power level by 26.9 
experimental dollars in off-peak periods (p-value=0.0043) and insignificantly by 12.2 
experimental dollars in shoulder 1 periods (p-value=0.1529). In peak (shoulder 2) periods 
of the PCM/Power treatment, the prices are not significantly greater than the PCM/No 
Power prices [p-value=0.8799 (0.1732)]. However, the prices in shoulder 2 periods are 
not significantly higher than the “truth” telling outcome, i.e. the Bertrandesqe  
                                                 
12 The p-values for the PCM/No Power treatment are based on the linear mixed-effects model where the 
benchmark treatment is PCM/No Power. These estimates parallel the estimates reported in table 4. 
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(b) PCM/No Power vs. PCM/Power 
Figure 2. Buyer Prices by Level of Demand for the Last 17 Market Days in Each Session
 23
 24
Table 4. Estimates of the Linear Mixed Effects Model of Treatment Effects for the Buyer 
Prices 
Priceij - Pt=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2Poweri+β3PCMi×Poweri+β4Firsti+β5Secondi+β6PCMi×Firsti+β7PCMi×Secondi+β8Poweri× 
Firsti+β9Poweri×Secondi+β10PCMi×Poweri×Firsti+ β11PCMi×Poweri×Secondi+εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ N(0,σ22,i) 
 Estimate Std. Error Degrees of Freedom Ha t-statistic p-value 
Off-peak       
µ 7.38 5.99 824 µ>0 1.23 0.1092 
PCM 9.70 8.46 12 β1≠0 1.15 0.2736 
Power 10.98 8.53 12 β2>0 1.29 0.1112 
PCM×Power 15.88 12.07 12 β3≠0 1.32 0.2131 
First -6.71 1.22 824 β4≠0 -5.51 <.0001 
Second -2.72 1.22 824 β5≠0 -2.23 0.0262 
PCM×First 4.25 1.46 824 β6≠0 2.91 0.0037 
PCM×Second 1.04 1.46 824 β7≠0 0.72 0.4748 
Power×First 6.39 1.97 824 β8≠0 3.24 0.0012 
Power×Second 3.29 1.97 824 β9≠0 1.67 0.0952 
PCM×Power×First -7.41 2.62 824 β10≠0 -2.83 0.0047 
PCM×Power×Second 2.62 2.62 824 β11≠0 1.00 0.3166 
Shoulder 1       
µ 18.53 8.05 824 µ>0 2.30 0.0108 
PCM -1.86 11.33 12 β1≠0 -0.16 0.8724 
Power -1.42 11.45 12 β2>0 -0.12 0.5482 
PCM×Power 13.58 16.14 12 β3≠0 0.84 0.4164 
First -7.98 2.17 824 β4≠0 -3.68 0.0003 
Second -1.61 2.17 824 β5≠0 -0.74 0.4595 
PCM×First 15.69 2.44 824 β6≠0 6.44 <.0001 
PCM×Second 3.26 2.44 824 β7≠0 1.34 0.1818 
Power×First 0.26 3.33 824 β8≠0 0.08 0.9375 
Power×Second 8.65 3.33 824 β9≠0 2.59 0.0096 
PCM×Power×First -5.68 3.55 824 β10≠0 -1.60 0.1099 
PCM×Power×Second -9.11 3.55 824 β11≠0 -2.57 0.0105 
Peak       
µ 57.17 7.67 824 µ>0 7.45 <.0001 
PCM 2.87 10.84 12 β1≠0 0.26 0.7957 
Power -10.66 10.86 12 β2>0 -0.98 0.8272 
PCM×Power -2.84 15.41 12 β3≠0 -0.18 0.8567 
First -2.09 1.85 824 β4≠0 -1.14 0.2565 
Second 4.37 1.85 824 β5≠0 2.36 0.0183 
PCM×First -6.54 2.50 824 β6≠0 -2.62 0.0090 
PCM×Second -7.72 2.50 824 β7≠0 -3.09 0.0021 
Power×First -8.37 2.75 824 β8≠0 -3.05 0.0024 
Power×Second -4.00 2.75 824 β9≠0 -1.46 0.1453 
PCM×Power×First 11.00 4.10 824 β10≠0 2.68 0.0074 
PCM×Power×Second 6.56 4.10 824 β11≠0 1.60 0.1099 
Shoulder 2       
µ 0.66 4.00 824 µ>0 0.17 0.4345 
PCM 1.22 5.67 12 β1≠0 0.21 0.8338 
Power 3.45 5.84 12 β2>0 0.59 0.2828 
PCM×Power 2.14 8.16 12 β3≠0 0.26 0.7975 
First -0.51 0.28 824 β4≠0 -1.79 0.0733 
Second -0.31 0.28 824 β5≠0 -1.10 0.2723 
PCM×First 10.88 1.25 824 β6≠0 8.72 <.0001 
PCM×Second 3.67 1.25 824 β7≠0 2.94 0.0034 
Power×First -3.22 2.15 824 β8≠0 -1.50 0.1342 
Power×Second 0.24 2.15 824 β9≠0 0.11 0.9102 
PCM×Power×First -5.25 2.53 824 β10≠0 -2.08 0.0383 
PCM×Power×Second -3.67 2.53 824 β11≠0 -1.45 0.1468 
Note. The linear mixed-effects model is fit by maximum likelihood with 848 original observations and 16 sessions. For 
purposes of the brevity the session random effects are not included in the table. 
competitive equilibrium, in both OCM/No Power and PCM/No Power treatments (p-
values=0.4345, 0.3204).■ 
 
Finding 1 raises the question as to whether a complex offer nature brings any value 
to wholesale electricity markets. The opportunity to recover fixed and variable costs at 
exact proportions is not used even during the most competitive periods of the experiment. 
 
Finding 2: The supracompetitive buyer prices in the OCM and the PCM auctions are due 
to the heightened offers on both start-up fee and seller price dimensions. All treatments 
result in similar aggregate daily amounts paid to sellers in terms of fees and seller prices. 
 
Support: Table 5 presents the mixed-effects models of treatment effects for the income 
from fees and for the income from seller prices. The dependent variable in this case is the 
difference between the observed income from fees (seller prices), FeeInc (PriceInc), and 
the income from fees (seller prices) when generation costs are perfectly revealed by the 
sellers, FeeInct (PriceInc t). The estimates from the models point out that the sellers 
receive significantly higher incomes than in the “truth” outcome by increasing both fees 
and seller prices. In the OCM/No Power treatment, the daily amount of fees exceeds the 
true start-up costs by 171.9 experimental dollars (p-value=0.0474) and the price income 
surpasses the variable production costs by 871.9 experimental dollars (p-value=0.0001). 
The estimates for the PCM/No Power (PCM/Power, OCM/Power) treatment do not 
significantly differ from the OCM/No Power treatment estimates [fee income p-
values=0.8297 (0.1066, 0.7223); price income p-values=0.8180 (0.1830, 0.6423)]. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the Linear Mixed Effects Model of Treatment Effects for the 
Income from Fees and Seller Prices 
FeeIncij - FeeInct=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2Poweri+β3PCMi×Poweri+β4Firsti+β5Secondi+β6PCMi×Firsti+β7PCMi×Secondi+ 
β8Poweri×Firsti+β9Poweri×Secondi+β10PCMi×Poweri×Firsti+ β11PCMi×Poweri×Secondi+εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ 
N(0,σ22,i) 
 Estimate Std. Error Degrees of Freedom Ha t-statistic p-value 
Whole Day       
µ 171.93 86.58 824 1.99 0.0474 µ≠0 
β1≠0 PCM 26.94 122.56 12 0.22 0.8297 
-0.36 0.7223 Power -44.60 122.58 12 β2≠0 
β3≠0 PCM×Power 304.94 174.79 12 1.74 0.1066 
β4≠0 -14.58 <.0001 First -229.16 15.72 824 
β5≠0 Second -83.79 15.72 824 -5.33 <.0001 
β6≠0 7.93 <.0001 PCM×First 168.75 21.27 824 
β7≠0 PCM×Second 78.82 21.27 824 3.71 0.0002 
β8≠0 6.31 <.0001 Power×First 146.35 23.20 824 
β9≠0 Power×Second 85.44 23.20 824 3.68 0.0002 
β10≠0 -8.95 <.0001 PCM×Power×First -350.28 39.14 824 
β11≠0 PCM×Power×Second -124.61 39.14 824 -318 0.0015 
PriceIncij -PriceInct=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2Poweri+β3PCMi×Poweri+β4Firsti+β5Secondi+β6PCMi×Firsti+β7PCMi×Secondi+ 
β8Poweri×Firsti+β9Poweri×Secondi+β10PCMi×Poweri×Firsti+ β11PCMi×Poweri×Secondi+εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ 
N(0,σ22,i) 
Whole Day       
µ 871.79 132.26 824 6.59 0.0001 µ≠0 
β1≠0 PCM 44.12 187.51 12 0.24 0.8180 
-0.48 0.6423 Power -89.36 187.56 12 β2≠0 
β3≠0 PCM×Power -376.89 266.66 12 -1.41 0.1830 
β4≠0 -2.27 0.0233 First -82.44 36.28 824 
β5≠0 Second 113.41 36.28 824 3.13 0.0018 
β6≠0 1.15 0.2506 PCM×First 65.34 56.83 824 
β7≠0 PCM×Second -121.53 56.83 824 -2.14 0.0328 
β8≠0 -4.62 <.0001 Power×First -255.34 55.26 824 
β9≠0 Power×Second -108.16 55.26 824 -1.96 0.0506 
β10≠0 3.64 0.0003 PCM×Power×First 317.92 87.31 824 
β11≠0 PCM×Power×Second 123.33 87.31 824 1.41 0.1582 
 
Note. The linear mixed-effects model is fit by maximum likelihood with 848 original observations and 16 sessions. For 
purposes of the brevity the session random effects are not included in the table. 
The low and intermediate cost plants that did not sell during the off-peak and 
shoulder 1 periods are namely responsible for the inflated fees. Since they need to be 
started for higher demand periods, they can offer high start-up fees for those periods and 
still undercut the higher cost generation plants. For instance, in session 2 of the OCM/No 
Power treatment, S3 is able to charge as much as 80 (true start-up cost=10) experimental 
dollars to start his low cost one-unit plant during the intermediate demand periods. 
Similarly, during the intermediate demand periods of session 1 of the PCM/No Power 
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treatment, S1 is able to charge 195 (true start-up cost=0) experimental dollars to start her 
low cost two-unit plant. These big payoffs from fees do not leave many incentives to 
compete for the contracts during the lower demand periods. Indeed, such withholding of 
capacity for higher demand periods explains why competition is so weak even in the “No 
Power” treatments. The Power treatments exhibit similar offer strategies as well. In 
session 1 of the PCM/Power treatment, S4 is constantly able to charge 500 (true start-up 
cost=6) experimental dollars to start an intermediate cost plant during the peak periods.■ 
 
In Table 5, the significant coefficients for early periods (e.g. First, Second etc.) also 
show that the sellers are actively adjusting their offer strategies for both fees and prices 
over time. Interestingly, the OCM auction starts with low fees in the beginning of the 
experiment and increases them as the time goes on, whereas the PCM auction starts with 
high fees and lowers them over time.  
Finding 2 highlights two important points with respect to the total procurement cost 
of a commodity. First, there are no special institutional effects on offer strategies towards 
the end of the experiment. Second, the sellers in a more competitive environment (No 
Power treatment) are able to extract the same amount of wealth as in an environment 
with structural market power (Power treatment). Finding 2 might be an explanation why 
there are some attempts from the ISOs’ side to limit frequent offer changes for start-up 
fees, while remaining faithful to the unregulated nature of the seller prices. The effects of 
such restrictions are still to be evaluated.  
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Finding 3: In all treatments with an exception of PCM/No Power, sellers supply the 
efficient amount of the product to the market during all periods of a day.  
 
Support: It is easy to see from Figure 2 that fourteen out of sixteen sessions resulted in 
100% efficient buyer prices and only two PCM/Power sessions clearly failed to supply 
the efficient quantity to the market. However, this does not necessarily mean that all 
OCM sessions succeeded to do that during all days. In fact, the demand had to be 
interrupted on 19 occasions (out of possible 544 = 17days× 4quarters× 8 sessions) in the 
OCM sessions, because the buyer price for the efficient amount exceeded buyers’ 
maximum willingness to pay. Besides the two PCM/Power sessions, the demand was 
interrupted on 5 occasions in other PCM sessions. Interestingly, there is not a single 
occasion when the demand had to be interrupted during the shoulder 2 periods regardless 
of the auction.■ 
 
Failure to supply the efficient amount of product to the market is not the only 
source of possible inefficiencies. The social surplus might also be reduced by production 
inefficiencies, i.e. the situations when the higher-cost plants produce the product instead 
of the lower-cost plants. 
 
Finding 4: All OCM and PCM treatments exhibit similar degrees of production 
inefficiency with an exception of peak periods. In peak periods, the PCM/Power and 
OCM/No Power treatments generate significantly higher production costs than the 
PCM/No Power and OCM/Power treatments. 
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 Support: Figure 3 and the estimates from the mixed-effects model in Table 6 report 
evidence that in all but peak periods, the treatments are not significantly different from 
each other. The dependent variable in this case is the difference between the observed 
production cost (ProdCost) and the production cost when all sellers perfectly reveal their 
private generation costs, ProdCostt. All estimates for the last 17 days in the experiment 
are insignificant for both shoulder 1 and shoulder 2 periods. Note that if the true costs 
were revealed, in the shoulder 1 periods, the OCM auction would have produced a more 
efficient allocation of contracts than in the PCM auction. In off-peak periods, the Power 
treatments result in higher production costs than No Power treatments, but the differences 
are insignificant. As hypothesized in the beginning of the paper, production inefficiencies 
are expected in the off-peak periods of the Power treatments, because it is more 
profitable for S1 to supply half of the market demand and ask for a high pay rather than to 
compete with S3 for the whole market demand and receive a competitive return. 
In peak periods, the estimates from the mixed-effects models suggest that the 
production costs in the PCM/Power treatment are not significantly different from the 
OCM/No Power treatment. Similarly, the production costs in the PCM/No Power 
treatment are not significantly different from the OCM/Power treatment. But the 
PCM/Power and OCM/No Power treatments attain significantly higher production costs 
than the PCM/No Power and OCM/Power treatments (p-value=0.0898 and 0.0462).13 
These empirical differences in peak periods are surprising since all unilateral deviations 
from the competitive outcome are unprofitable in all treatments. Another indicator of 
                                                 
13 The p-values for the PCM treatment are based on the linear mixed-effects model where the benchmark 
treatment is PCM/No Power. These estimates parallel the estimates reported in table 6. 
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(b) PCM/No Power vs. PCM/Power 
Figure 3. Average Total Costs by Level of Demand for the Last 17 Market Days in Each 
Session
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Table 6. Estimates of the Linear Mixed Effects Model of Treatment Effects for the 
Production Costs 
 
ProdCostij - ProdCostt=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2Poweri+β3PCMi×Poweri+β4Firsti+β5Secondi+β6PCMi×Firsti+β7PCMi×Secondi+ 
β8Poweri×Firsti+β9Poweri×Secondi+β10PCMi×Poweri×Firsti+ β11PCMi×Power×Secondi+εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ 
N(0,σ22,i) 
 Estimate Std. Error Degrees of Freedom Ha t-statistic p-value 
Off-peak       
Due to the lack of variability of the dependent variable, the model cannot be estimated for the off-peak periods. 
Treatment averages and standard deviations are presented instead. 
 Average Std. Dev.     
OCM/No Power 1.69 2.38     
PCM/No Power 0.00 0.00     
OCM/Power 5.16 20.78     
PCM/Power 5.37 14.57     
Shoulder 1       
µ 36.98 31.10 824 µ≠0 1.19 0.2347 
PCM 43.39 43.97 12 β1≠0 0.99 0.3434 
Power 53.90 45.47 12 β2≠0 1.19 0.2588 
PCM×Power -54.62 63.51 12 β3≠0 -0.86 0.4067 
First 114.04 15.02 824 β4≠0 7.59 <.0001 
Second 36.72 15.02 824 β5≠0 2.45 0.0147 
PCM×First -58.45 20.89 824 β6≠0 -2.80 0.0053 
PCM×Second -12.55 20.89 824 β7≠0 -0.60 0.5483 
Power×First -8.82 26.48 824 β8≠0 -0.33 0.7391 
Power×Second 83.57 26.48 824 β9≠0 3.16 0.0017 
PCM×Power×First 28.90 32.61 824 β10≠0 0.89 0.3757 
PCM×Power×Second -96.43 32.61 824 β11≠0 -2.96 0.0032 
Peak       
µ 230.13 38.04 824 µ≠0 6.05 <.0001 
PCM -146.37 53.21 12 β1≠0 -2.75 0.0176 
Power -120.62 54.26 12 β2≠0 -2.22 0.0462 
PCM×Power 217.83 75.63 12 β3≠0 2.88 0.0138 
First -62.30 23.78 824 β4≠0 -2.62 0.0090 
Second -51.04 23.78 824 β5≠0 -2.15 0.0322 
PCM×First 116.18 32.71 824 β6≠0 3.55 0.0004 
PCM×Second 97.35 32.71 824 β7≠0 2.98 0.0030 
Power×First 100.62 34.95 824 β8≠0 2.88 0.0041 
Power×Second 88.91 34.95 824 β9≠0 2.54 0.0112 
PCM×Power×First -204.19 46.85 824 β10≠0 -4.36 <.0001 
PCM×Power×Second -153.55 46.85 824 β11≠0 -3.28 0.0011 
Shoulder 2       
µ 46.98 29.24 824 µ≠0 1.61 0.1086 
PCM -5.45 41.13 12 β1≠0 -0.13 0.8967 
Power -1.71 43.31 12 β2≠0 -0.04 0.9691 
PCM×Power 32.37 59.90 12 β3≠0 0.54 0.5988 
First 116.74 12.19 824 β4≠0 9.58 <.0001 
Second 28.77 12.19 824 β5≠0 2.36 0.0185 
PCM×First -55.55 17.19 824 β6≠0 -3.23 0.0013 
PCM×Second -14.68 17.19 824 β7≠0 -0.85 0.3934 
Power×First 32.06 25.39 824 β8≠0 1.26 0.2072 
Power×Second 80.53 25.39 824 β9≠0 3.17 0.0016 
PCM×Power×First -41.96 30.28 824 β10≠0 -1.39 0.1663 
PCM×Power×Second -104.42 30.28 824 β11≠0 -3.45 0.0006 
Note. The linear mixed-effects model is fit by maximum likelihood with 848 original observations and 16 sessions. For 
purposes of the brevity the session random effects are not included in the table. 
production efficiency could be the frequency of how often the very high cost generators 
of H and I types are called to produce. During the last 17 days in the experiment, these 
generators are selected in peak periods and make positive profits for 42 (4) times [out of 
possible 68 = 17days× 4sessions] in the OCM/No Power (/Power) treatment and for 6 
(28) times in the PCM/No Power (/Power) treatment. The most inefficient plants (type I) 
make significant profits by offering low prices and recovering their variable costs through 
high start-up fees. Note that these plants would never sell profitably if they had to recover 
their costs only through prices.■ 
 
One might wonder why the more efficient plants are unsuccessful in competing 
with the high cost plants since all sellers could use similar strategies. My guess is that this 
outcome reflects incomplete information about the returns in the market. While the seller 
prices are publicly announced in the market, the collected individual start-up fees are not 
known to other sellers. Possibly, it is the lack of transparency in earnings (rather than 
production costs) that weakens the performance of these auctions with regards to the 
production efficiency. 
 
Finding 5: The variance of buyer prices from day to day for the same level of demand is 
lower with the PCM auction than with the OCM auction, holding the No Power design 
constant. The Power treatments result in higher variances than the No Power treatments.  
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Figure 4. Buyer Price Variances by Treatment for the Last 17 Market Days 
 
Support: Figure 4 summarizes the price variances for the sixteen sessions presented here. 
The statistics use the last 17 days of each session to allow for the convergence of the 
observed prices evident in Table 4. Individual session variances are averaged across each 
treatment. From Figure 4, it is clear that the PCM auction reduces the volatility of prices 
compared to the OCM auction in all periods. It is also evident that the Power design 
raises the volatility of prices compared to the corresponding No Power treatments. Also 
note that, with the exception of the PCM/Power treatment, the buyer price volatility 
substantially drops in shoulder 2 periods when most of the plants are not eligible to 
receive start-up fees.■ 
 
Overall, both the OCM and the PCM auctions do not exhibit major differences with 
regards to buyer prices, allocative or production efficiency. The expected institutional 
effects with regards to these criteria are greatly dominated by the effects of strategic 
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behavior that arises due to the offer structure in these auctions. Incentives to start-up the 
plants during the higher demand periods and the ability to sell higher cost units by 
manipulating the combination of offered fees and prices have strong anti-competitive 
effects. The outcomes of the No Power treatments approach the outcomes of the Power 
design.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper compares the performance of the OCM and the PCM sealed complex-
offer auctions in a dynamic trading environment that models wholesale electricity 
markets. Game theory predicts that in a competitive environment, marginal generators 
will submit offers that are equal to the actual production costs of the marginal units. This 
leads to low prices of electricity to the buyers. However, if a market is concentrated, the 
theory suggests that the sellers can profitably increase the prices to the buyers regardless 
of the auction. Specifically, in the discussed environment, both the OCM and the PCM 
auction should perform similarly in the off-peak periods, while in the shoulder 1 periods, 
the PCM auction should result in lower procurement cost and the OCM auction should 
lead to more efficient contract allocations.  
The results of the experiment indicate that in a competitive environment the 
marginal generators do not reveal their actual production costs in both auctions. In fact, 
the sellers are able to increase the buyer prices to the level of a concentrated market even 
in an environment with no structural market power. Both auctions do not exhibit strong 
differences in overall performance.  
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While theoretical analyses model the market demand as static, the experimental 
environment simulates a cyclical nature of the market demand. It appears that in the 
experiment, the intertemporal strategic behavior dominates the expected institutional 
effects of the two auctions. Market participants use fixed start-up fees very strategically 
in these complex-offer auctions. The incentives to start-up the plants during the higher 
demand periods practically extinguish competition. Furthermore, given the offer 
complexity and the cyclical nature of market demand, it becomes impossible to design a 
competitive environment during the lower demand periods. Even if new cheap-capacity 
plants entered the market, they would have the same incentives to withhold their start-ups 
for the periods with a higher market demand.  
The outcomes for shoulder 2 periods, however, are noticeably more competitive and 
predictable. Since the start-up costs are basically absent in the shoulder 2 periods, and 
therefore, most plants are not eligible to receive the start-up fees, one might ponder how 
simpler and more transparent these markets could be if these fixed costs did not exist. But 
they do. And it is clear that allowing the sellers to recover their fixed and variable costs 
separately does not enhance the transparency in the market. 
To sum it up, the OCM and the PCM auctions are not truth revealing mechanisms 
and do not elicit competitive behavior in an unregulated market. These findings beg the 
question as to whether a simple-offer auction could mitigate the anti-competitive 
behavior in the described trading environment. 
 35
 References 
 
1. Alonso J., A. Trias, V. Gaitan, & Alba, J. (1999). Thermal Plant Bids and Market 
Clearing in an Electricity Pool. Minimization of Costs vs. Minimization of Consumer 
Payments. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 14(4), 1327-1334. 
2. Arroyo, J., & Conejo, A. (2002). Miltiperiod Auction for a Pool-Based Electricity 
Market. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 17(4), 1225-1231. 
3. Baltaduonis, R. (2006). Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost 
Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction. University of Connecticut 
working paper. 
4. Davis, D., & Holt, C. (1994). Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory Markets with 
Posted Prices. RAND Journal of Economics, 25(3), 467-487. 
5. Holt, C. (1989). The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 32, S107-S130. 
6. Kiesling, L., & Wilson, B. (2007). An Experimental Analysis of the Effects of 
Automated Mitigation Procedures on Investment and prices in Wholesale Electricity 
Markets. Forthcoming in Journal of Regulatory Economics. 
7. Knoblauch, V. (2005). Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in 
U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic 
Analysis. University of Connecticut working paper. 
8. Longford, N. (1993). Random Coefficient Models. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
 36
9. Luh, P., W. Blankson, Y. Chen, J. Yan, G. Stern, S. Chang, & Zhao, F. (2005a). 
Payment Cost Minimization Auction for Deregulated Electricity Markets Using 
Surrogate Optimization. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Available at 
http://www.engr.uconn.edu/msl/workingpaper/index.htm.  
10. Mount, T., W. Schulze, R. Thomas & Zimmerman, R. (2001). Testing the 
Performance of Uniform Price and Discriminative Auctions. Presented at the Rutger's 
Center for Research in Regulated Industries 14th Annual Western Conference: 
Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, Competitive Change in 
Network Industries, San Diego, CA. 
11. Padhy, N. (2004). Unit Commitment – A Bibliographical Survey. IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, 19(3), 1196-1205. 
12. Rassenti, S., V. Smith, & Wilson, B. (2003a). Controlling Market Power and Price 
Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand Side-Bidding. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 10(5). 
13. Rassenti, S., V. Smith, & Wilson, B. (2005b). Discriminatory Price Auctions in 
Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels. Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 23(2), 109-123. 
14. Shunda, N. (2005). Strategic behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for 
Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization? University of Connecticut 
working paper. 
15. Yan, J., & Stern, G. (2002). Simultaneous Optimal Auction and Unit Commitment for 
Deregulated Electricity Markets. Electricity Journal. 
 37
Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
<page 1> 
Welcome 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you read the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money that 
will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 
The experiment will take place through the computer terminals at which you are seated. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and a monitor will come to 
assist you. 
 
In this experiment, owners of plants sell an identical product to a computer buyer every 
day. Each day lasts 75 seconds. You are an owner of #yourNumberOfPlants# plants. 
There are #numberOfSellers# sellers and #numberOfPlants# plants including yours.  
Each seller owns between 1 and 4 plants.  
 
<page 2> 
Each day is divided into 4 quarters.  Each quarter is represented by a line in the table at 
the top of your screen.  The computer will purchase varying quantities of the product over 
the course of a day: Low, Medium, High and Medium amounts. 
Sellers submit offers to sell. An offer indicates the prices and quantities of the product 
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that you are willing to sell during the course of the following day. All quantities are 
measured in number of units. 
<page 3> 
You as a seller are able to decide: 
 
Price/unit is the price per unit you are willing to sell at during that quarter from that 
plant.  This is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell.  The actual market 
price may be higher depending on the demand of the product. Each seller receives the 
same market price for sold units during the quarter. The market price is the highest 
accepted Price/unit among all of the sellers. If you sell the product you also incur a cost 
per unit sold.  This cost is listed on the right side under the table and must be paid for 
each unit you sell. 
 
Start-Up Fee is a fee that is paid to you for turning on your plant. The fee is paid to you 
only if the plant was not operating during the previous quarter. When your plant is turned 
on, you also must pay the start-up cost, which is listed on the right side under the table. 
 
You will be able to make this decision for each quarter of the upcoming day for each 
plant that you have. 
 
<page 4> 
To switch between plants click on the tabs at the top of your screen.  To enter the values 
select the appropriate cell in the table and double click. 
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 Some offer values are automatically filled in for you: 
 
Min Qty is the minimum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
that plant. Min Qty must be ≥ Minimum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
This will be filled with that plant’s Minimum Capacity. 
 
Max Qty is the maximum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
that plant. Max Qty must be ≤ Maximum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
Max Qty must also be ≥ Min Qty. This will be filled with that plant’s Maximum 
Capacity. 
 
<page 5 PCM> 
Offers are sent to the computerized market coordinator when you click the Submit button 
or when the day is over. Your offer from the previous day will be automatically 
submitted for you if you choose not to make any changes during the course of a day. 
 
The computerized market coordinator accepts those offers that satisfy the market demand 
during the day at the lowest total procurement cost, simultaneously determining the 
market price as the highest accepted Price/unit for that quarter. 
 
If your offer has not been accepted, it means that other offers were able to satisfy the 
market demand at a lower or equal cost. The results are displayed on the right side of the 
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table; you may need to scroll to the right to see them.  Once you have reviewed the 
results of the previous day enter your offers for the next day for each plant and submit. 
 
The right side of the table is filled in after everyone has submitted their offers. 
Your profit during each quarter of a day is:  
(Units Sold × market price + Start-Up Fees collected) – (Units Sold × Cost/unit + Start-
Up Costs incurred) 
 
<page 5 OCM> 
Offers are sent to the computerized market coordinator when you click the Submit button 
or when the day is over. Your offer from the previous day will be automatically 
submitted for you if you choose not to make any changes during the course of a day. 
 
The computerized market coordinator accepts those offers that satisfy the market demand 
during the day at the lowest total offered cost. After the offers are selected, the market 
price is determined as the highest accepted Price/unit for that quarter. 
 
If your offer has not been accepted, it means that other offers were able to satisfy the 
market demand at a lower or equal cost. The results are displayed on the right side of the 
table; you may need to scroll to the right to see them.  Once you have reviewed the 
results of the previous day enter your offers for the next day for each plant and submit. 
 
The right side of the table is filled in after everyone has submitted their offers. 
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Your profit during each quarter of a day is:  
(Units Sold × market price + Start-Up Fees collected) – (Units Sold × Cost/unit + Start-
Up Costs incurred) 
 
<page 6> 
A history of the prices from the past 10 days and the sold quantities during each quarter 
of the last day are displayed in the bottom portion of your screen. 
 
Information about all plants (including yours) is available to all sellers by clicking on the 
Technology and costs button. 
 
Plants are restarted at the beginning of each day, meaning that during the first quarter of 
each day you receive your start-up fee and incur the start-up cost if you sell the product. 
 
At the end of today’s session, your ‘computer dollars’ will be converted into cash at a 
rate of #exchangeRate# computer dollars to US$1. If you have any questions please raise 
your hand.  Press Start when you are ready to begin. 
 
Even if you decide to keep your offer from the previous day, click the Submit button. The 
experiment will advance to the next day after everyone has clicked on the Submit button. 
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Appendix B: Sample Screen Shot 
 
  
Figure B1. Sample Screen Shot. 
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